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BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENCE – 
TECHNOLOGY, EFFECTIVENESS  AND 
ORGANIZATION – KEY ISSUES
The article serves as an introduction to the set of papers that are devoted to the 
issue of ballistic missile defence as seen from the Polish perspective. It therefore 
refers in the most general terms to the key problems of the technology and the 
organization of missile defence. First of all, ballistic missiles and their strategic 
roles are considered as it is necessary to understand the threat before the defence 
against it is analyzed. Secondly, the nature of the ballistic missile defence is de-
scribed, together with extensive reflections on its effectiveness. Further on the 
paper depicts in short missile defence systems of the world with the special at-
tention to the United States. 
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This article is an introductory part of the collection of four consecutive articles per-
taining to the issue of missile defence. This function reflects in its form and substance, 
as it is supposed to provide the background for further considerations. Therefore, we 
are going to explain here the basic technical and organizational realities that define 
missile defence. It seems especially valuable, because detailed technical issues are usu-
ally omitted in general considerations or, at best, are brought to the simple tally of the 
armaments together with the uncritically optimistic assessment of the effectiveness of 
certain weapons systems. Such an attitude dominates the public and political space, 
especially in Poland, where real knowledge on the matter is usually juxtaposed to wish-
ful thinking. But the technical side of the problem is by far more complicated than it is 
commonly understood. The more comprehensive analyses suppose rather sceptical ap-
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praisal of the capabilities of the contemporary missile defence. So, as this set of papers 
considers missile defence in the context of the national security of Poland it seems right 
to start it with the assessment that could provide such an analysis, even if short and very 
general one. Therefore, the main technical determinants, the current state of missile 
defence in the world and its effectiveness, together with the most general political and 
strategic realities will be mentioned in this text.
Such a technical approach is valuable especially because the technologies involved 
determine the basic parameters of weapon systems and that define their combat effec-
tiveness. This in turn reflects on the tasks that a certain weapon could carry out and 
then on the role of missile defence as an instrument of the security policy of the state 
and, in many instances, of its broadly understood foreign policy as well. However ob-
vious it might seem, the problem still persists that the technical realities determined 
by the related laws of physics and the capabilities of certain technologies are largely 
unknown to the public. It is hard to find well informed opinions even in the politi-
cal discourse or within the foreign policy experts community, again especially in Po-
land. It is usually instinctively assumed that missile defence it is just another air defence, 
with some special features of course, but essentially the same in nature. Such thinking is 
deeply flawed, as missile defence profoundly differs from the classic air defence, much 
more than it is commonly believed.
Let us therefore reiterate that there is not only the need but also the necessity to de-
tail some technical realities in order to understand the military and the political mean-
ing of missile defence. This, however, requires a host of complex technical and organi-
zational issues to be risen in the paper which is supposed to remain within the realm of 
the political science, and this is not an easy task. On the one hand, we have to address 
quite a complicated matter starting with reminding of the basic laws of the nature, on 
the other we must avoid too much technical reasoning that would likely become un-
clear to the reader of this journal which is devoted to the social sciences, not to the 
physics, engineering, technology or the military sciences.
Another difficulty is that our topic concerns the issues that are not only kept top 
secret but are also a subject of various disinformation activities. The latter is mainly due 
to the fact that missile defence is usually a very important factor in many international 
and internal political controversies, with economic interest and business opportunities 
in the background. Thus it is difficult not only to get the accurate data regarding the 
key technical parameters, but also to sort out the false information which exists in great 
abundance. Fortunately, there are many research centres and independent experts that 
deal with the available information and publish technical issues already processed into 
a more accessible form. There are also unclassified reports prepared by credible state 
institutions or scientific bodies that shed light on the important technical problems. 
This very paper is based on the selection of such sources, although we cannot always 
quote them directly or in full in order to avoid excessive technicality of the argument. 
The most important are: mostlymissiledefence.com, Missilethreat, GlobalSecurity, 
Arms Control Assciation, Union of Concerned Scientists, Federation of American Sci-
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entists, National Research Council of the National Academies, Defense Science Board 
and Congressional Research Service – there are of course many more.
The order of this article is as follows. Firstly, we describe ballistic missiles as 
a  weapon, because their properties obviously reflect on missile defence – thus we de-
fine and describe the threat. Secondly, we discuss missile defence as such – specifically 
pointing out at its inherent limitations. And finally, we shortly present missile defence 
arsenals of the world with particular reference to the United States. 
1. BALLISTIC MISSILES – THE CHARACTER OF THE THREAT
The first question we have to address when we start the considerations on missile de-
fence is against what it is directed, because the defence always follows the existence of 
the offence. Today there is a number of weapon systems that are named by their design-
ers, operators and owners missile defence (MD) or ballistic missile defence (BMD).1 
The basic task of such systems is to destroy ballistic missiles in flight. 
According to the most common definition, a ballistic missile is a rocket-propelled 
self-guided strategic-weapons system that follows a ballistic trajectory to deliver a payload 
from its launch site to a predetermined target.2 This notion is as widely accepted as it is 
misguiding because it is very narrow and in fact refers only to the very special kind of 
a ballistic missile. The more precise definition produced by the US Department of De-
fence states that a ballistic missile is [a]ny missile which does not rely upon aerodynamic 
surfaces to produce lift and consequently follows a ballistic trajectory when thrust is termi-
nated.3 In turn, a missile is in a strict sense an object that is thrown, shot, or launched as 
a weapon […].4 To clarify all those considerations we have to underline three distinct 
features of a ballistic missile: it is a rocket, it is a missile and it moves along a ballistic 
trajectory. 
A rocket is a kind of vehicle which is propelled by an engine that induces its move-
ment by a reaction force of a jet stream of hot gases produced while burning fuel with 
oxidizer which is carried by this very object. To describe it plainly let us point to the 
important difference between a rocket engine (motor) and a common airbreathing jet 
engine (motor). The latter gathers the oxygen for the combustion from the air it moves 
through, while the former carries both the fuel and the oxygen (oxydizer) in the tanks 
1 Russian: противоракетная оборона – ПРО, Hebrew equivalent of the term BMD:
French: La défense antimissile, German: Raketenabwehr.
2 “Ballistic Missile”, in Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2017, at <https://www.britannica.com/technology/
ballistic-missile>, 9 February 2017.
3 “Ballistic Missile”, in DoD Dictionary, 2017, at <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/dod_dictionary/
data/b/2726.html>, 9 February 2017.
4 “Missile”, in Dictionary by Mirram-Webster, 2017, at <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
missile>, 9 February 2017.
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(in case of solid fuel rocket motors the mix of the fuel and the oxidizer is stored in solid 
state). There are three most important properties of a rocket engine:
 – very high thrust-to-weight ratio, that makes it capable to move a large masses and
accelerate them to high velocities,
 – very high fuel consumption, what means that a launch mass of a rocket in most cases 
consists mainly of fuel and oxidizer that burn out relatively fast,
 – it is capable to operate outside dense layers of the atmosphere and in the relative
vacuum of space.
It is a missile. If a rocket is supposed to hit distant objects as a weapon it becomes
a missile. We have to remember, however, that there are many other missiles that are not 
rocket-propelled. And there are of course many kinds of rocket-propelled missiles, mis-
sile defence deals only with some of them, namely with ballistic missiles.
A ballistic missile is a rocket-propelled missile, which travels the greatest part of its 
distance by the inertia, along the trajectory which is defined by the laws of Newtonian 
physics. In practice it means that during its relatively short work a rocket motor gives 
a missile desired speed and vector of movement and then it stops. The velocity, how-
ever, is already so high that the mass that remains after the burn-out of the fuel (and 
after the detachment of the lower stages in case of the composite missiles) covers very 
great distance compared to the propelled phase of the flight. For example, a ballistic 
missile with the range of 3000 km covers this distance in around 14 minutes, rising to 
the ceiling of some 650 km, but the accelerated portion of the trajectory has a dura-
tion of only 80-140 seconds and extends to 100-120 kilometres – all the rest of the 
flight proceeds due only to the energy gathered during the acceleration phase. In case 
the missile has a range of 10000 km, those values are, respectively: 30 minutes, 1300 
kilometres, 170-300 seconds and 18-220 kilometres. For the missile with 300 kilo-
metres of range it is, respectively: 4 minutes, 80 kilometres, 60-70 seconds and 25-35 
kilometres.5 All the above-mentioned calculations are based on the presumption that 
the given missile travels along the minimum-energy trajectory, what means that its 
throw vector has the angle optimized to achieve the greatest distance. If this angle is 
greater or lesser than that, the range decreases and the highest point of the trajectory is 
located higher or lower. All this also implies that ballistic missiles are very fast as well, 
their burn-out speed varies from 1.5 km/sec for the missiles of nominal range of 300-
400 kilometres to even 7 km/sec or more for those capable to cover 12000-15000 km.
These characteristic features of ballistic missiles are of the foremost importance 
from the point of view of their applications. Due to the great velocity and the high 
arching trajectory they are capable of delivering warheads very fast to very distant plac-
es with a great ease. It means that they can penetrate deep into the potential enemy’s 
defensive space very effectively and avoid counteraction because they are very difficult 
to destroy in-flight for many reasons that will be elaborated further on. It should be 
strongly underlined, that this certainty to achieve the desired effect by the use of ballis-
5 Data according to: J.M. Lindsay, M. O’Hanlon, Defending America. The Case for Limited National 
Missile Defense, Washington 2001, p. 34.
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tic missiles, regardless the enemy’s defence, is their most important trait and this is why 
their significance usually go beyond the military role on the battlefield. 
To clarify and summarize to this point, it has to be said that ballistic missiles of vari-
ous types and with various characteristics are of course very important instruments of 
warfighting of the countries that possess them. Some of the missile systems, the ones 
with the range of tens of kilometres or even several hundred kilometres are just the bat-
tlefield weapons, powerful but limited in use within the operational framework of the 
conventional conflict – they are usually called artillery-rocket systems. But other6 types, 
especially equipped with weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) or precision-guided 
munitions may become a separate and especially important instrument of security pol-
icy of a state, or even more broadly, of its foreign policy. 
The illustration of this mechanism may look as follows. Country A is threatened 
by country B which has a significant number of highly precise conventionally armed 
ballistic missiles in its arsenal. B is therefore able to strike A’s vital military and civilian 
targets within minutes, no matter how deep inside the territory they are located. Thus 
A may suffer very much without even slightest chance to avert at least the part of the 
damage, so it must consider that compelling fact in all its calculations vis-à-vis B. Of 
course, the existence of a missile defence would change this equation again, adding also 
to the uncertainty of the situation, as anti-missile systems are still largely unproven and 
in fact problematic as far as their real capabilities are considered. And this is exactly the 
reason why international relations, international security and strategic studies are inter-
ested in ballistic missile arsenals as tools of deterrence, coercion or intimidation and in 
missile defence as the instrument designed to offset the abovementioned capabilities. 
So let us reiterate that ballistic missiles are not just a warfighting tool but serve also as 
an instrument of broadly understood security and foreign policy of the state;7 the same 
refers to missile defence.8 Both are very important factors of the international stability 
and the balance of power on the global as well as on the regional level.
Currently there are dozens of countries and some non-state actors that possess the 
arsenals of ballistic missiles capable to become a political instrument in certain circum-
stances. We will shortly mention the most profound cases, highlighting the role of the 
missile stockpiles as the especially important tool. To maintain the clarity of the argu-
ment, from this point we will strictly follow the American, range based classification of 
ballistic missiles with the addition of the subcategory artillery-rocket systems which is 
important in some instances.
6 This is the theoretical classification; the real division in real situations may be blurred somehow.
7 More about the role of ballistic missiles in the states’ policies, see M. Czajkowski, Obrona przeciwrakie-
towa w stosunkach międzynarodowych, Kraków 2013, pp. 179-205.
8 More about the role of missile defence, see ibid., pp. 204-260.
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Table 1. The classification of ballistic missiles 
Range
ICBM Intercontinental Ballistic Missile Above 5500 km
IRBM Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile 3000-5500 km
MRBM Medium Range Ballistic Missile 1000-3000 km
SRBM Short Range Ballistic Missile up to 1000 km
SLBM Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile N/A
Source: National Air and Space Intelligence Center, Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat, Wright-Patterson 
AFB, Ohio, March 2006, p. 3.
USA. There is a large number of ICBMs and SLBMs in stock, that form two of the 
three elements of the classic strategic nuclear deterrence triad (the third leg is the force 
of long range bombers capable of delivering nuclear free-fall bombs and cruise missiles). 
They are the American ultimate safeguard on a global scale, so their basic task is to be 
able to perform retaliatory strike in every possible circumstance and against  every en-
emy. Thus they fulfil a very important role in the comprehensive US deterrence strategy. 
Russian Federation. ICBMs and SLBMs that Russia possess in a similar quantity 
as the United States,9 have the same function of the ultimate deterrent as the American 
counterparts. But Russia has also modern SRBM class missiles in its arsenals that may 
have the political importance as the deterrent in the smaller, regional scale. Their de-
ployment at the Russian borders may also be the important factor of the foreign policy, 
for example it may become the instrument of exerting pressure on the neighbours.10 
Those missiles can also be dispatched to various regions in the world, like recent de-
ployment of the Iskander missiles to Syria.11 There they serve as the political safeguard 
of the expeditionary operations and of the growing influence, as well as the proof of the 
Russian determination to continue the regional engagement. 
China. The People’s Republic of China also owns the ICBMs and SLBMs, their 
inventories and capabilities increase steadily. Although smaller in number, they fulfil 
the same mission that their American and Russian counterparts. But China’s arsenal 
comprises also of the large number of the MRBMs and SRBMs that may be armed 
with nuclear weapons or the precision-guided munitions. They have a key role within 
the framework of the Chinese military strategy, being also important part of the for-
9 For the exact numbers, see “New START Treaty Aggregate Numbers of Strategic Offensive Arms”, Bu-
reau of Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance, 1 April 2017, at <https://www.state.gov/t/avc/
newstart/269406.htm>, 7 April 2017.
10 V. Gera, J. Heintz, “Baltic Region Worried about Russian Missiles in Kaliningrad”, U.S. News, 8 Octo-
ber 2016, at <http://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2016-10-08/poland-concerned-about-
russian-missiles-sent-to-kaliningrad>, 8 January 2017.
11 B. Opall-Rome, “Israeli Satellite Imagery Shows Russian Nuclear-Capable Missiles in Syria”, Defense 
News, 6 January 2017, at <http://www.defensenews.com/articles/israeli-satellite-imagary-shows-
russian-nuclear-capable-missiles-in-syria>, 8 January 2017.
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eign policy of Beijing which is oriented to deny or at least to complicate foreign armed 
forces access to some crucial areas not only within but also outside the country’s bor-
ders. The implementation of this strategy, termed Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD), 
means that China is trying to exert its influence in the more and more remote regions 
through making them be accessible only by own armed forces. This strategy is aimed 
chiefly against the United States and the Chinese rocket force has its role here, as it is 
ready to attack the key American installations on the Far Eastern theatre, together with 
American aircraft carriers and the satellite systems. By doing so Beijing would be capa-
ble to impede the execution of the operational freedom of the US forces in the region 
and around it. The effectiveness of this strategy depends of course on the capability of 
the American missile defence deployed on the theatre to defeat Chinese missile should 
such need arise – this is not clear as of today, the whole issue will be discussed below. 
India. This country has a significant number of relatively modern SRBMs, MRBMs 
and IRBMs; there are also ICBMs and SLBMs in development. The main task of this 
arsenal is to form the core of the strategic deterrence policy that is directed against Pak-
istan and China, although it does not yet match more capable missile force of the lat-
ter.12 What is more, quick and comprehensive development of missile and space tech-
nology is very important part of the strategy to build the modern indigenous industrial 
base. It adds profoundly to the international prestige of India as well.
Pakistan. The main strategic foe of this country is undoubtedly India, therefore its 
MRBM and SRBM together with nuclear weapons pose mainly as a deterrent. They 
are a sort of the ultimate argument against the enemy which is otherwise superior by 
every military and economic standard, save the possession of the weapons of mass de-
struction. But if the weapons of mass destruction are to secure Pakistan’s safety they 
must be deliverable in every circumstance. With the overall superiority of India’s mili-
tary, ballistic missiles are the obvious choice as the most effective deterrent. This case 
shows very clearly the essence of the importance of ballistic missiles. 
Iran. Teheran considers its growing and steadily modernizing arsenal of SRBMs and 
MRBMs, together with the development of the IRBM, and perhaps even the ICBM, 
an asymmetric response to the military predominance of the USA, Israel and the Per-
sian Gulf states.13 It is supposed on the one hand to deter the enemies and to be an in-
strument of  coercion within the offensive strategies14 on the other. Iran frequently un-
derlines that there are at least 35 American military installations within the range of its 
12 S. Thaliyakkatti, Chinese Perceptions on India’s Long Range Missile Development: How Credible is 
India’s Deterrence against China?, ISAS Working Paper, no. 258, 24 April 2017, Institute of South 
Asian Studies, National University of Singapore, at <https://www.isas.nus.edu.sg/ISAS%20Reports/
ISAS%20Working%20Papers%20No.%20258-Chinese%20Perceptions%20on%20India’s%20Long%20
Range%20Missile%20Development.pdf>, 15 May 2017.
13 M. Elleman, W. Alsayed, “Ballistic Missile Defense Cooperation in the Arabian Gulf ”, in C.M. Kelle-
her, P. Dombrowski (eds.), Regional Missile Defense from a Global Perspective, Stanford 2015, p. 179.
14 P. Izewicz, Iran’s Ballistic Missile Programme. Its Status and the Way Forward, EU Non-Proliferation 
Papers, No. 57, SIPRI, Stockholm, April 2017.
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missiles;15 there are also advanced development efforts to construct the anti-ship ballis-
tic missile.16 This approach closely resembles the Chinese strategy with respect to that. 
North Korea. Korean missile stockpile consists of SRBMs and MRBMs, but this 
country does not hide that it is developing the ICBM class weapon and possibly even 
the anti-ship ballistic missile. In the security strategy of Pyongyang ballistic missiles 
are of the paramount importance17 – they are supposed to deter the United States by 
threatening the US armed forces, the American allies in the region (Republic of Korea 
and Japan) and, potentially, even the territory of the USA.18 Nuclear weapons, which 
North Korea is developing constantly and openly, are immanent part of this threat. The 
most recent developments clearly indicate the increasing capability of the increasingly 
diverse and versatile Korean missile force,19 highlighted by the apparently successful 
test of the missile which falls in the category of the ICBM with its calculated range of 
6700 km.20
Israel. Israeli missiles that belong to the MRBM and IRBM classes, perhaps also 
supplemented by the ICBMs, are important part of the nuclear deterrence against the 
unfriendly Arab states and Iran. The quick response time, i.e. very short period be-
tween the decision to do so and the actual launch of the missile is extremely important, 
having in mind Israel’s uncomfortable geostrategic position. 
Hamas, Hezbollah and other anti-Israel militant groups. These organizations 
possess large numbers of unguided ballistic missiles that may be labelled artillery-rocket 
systems, with ranges varying from a few to over a hundred kilometres. Despite the lim-
ited range, the lack of guidance systems and the conventional warheads, those weapons 
form the important part of the asymmetric war between Israel and these non-state actors, 
and the rockets were used as counter-value instruments – that is, to hurt and harass the ci-
vilian population […].21 It is because the military and strategic realities of Israel make the 
15 “Commander: IRGC Will Destroy 35 US Bases in Region if Attacked”, Fars News Agency, 4 July 2012, 
at <http://english2.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=9103084990>, 8 January 2017.
16 J. Binnie, “Iran Successfully Tests Radar-Guided Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile”, IHS Jane’s 360, 10 March 
2017, at <http://www.janes.com/article/68625/iran-successfully-tests-radar-guided-anti-ship-ballistic-
missile>, 7 April 2017.
17 J. Lewis, “Kim Jong Un’s Quest for an ICBM”, Foreign Affairs, 9 June 2017, at <https://www.
foreignaffairs.com/articles/north-korea/2017-06-09/kim-jong-uns-quest-icbm?cid=int-
lea&pgtype=hpg>, 10 June 2017.
18 More about the role of the North Korean missile arsenal, see M. Czajkowski, “Korea Północna vs. 
BMDS”, in W. Sokała, B. Zapała (eds.), Asymetria i hybrydowość – stare armie wobec nowych konfliktów, 
Warszawa 2011, pp. 65-70.
19 I. Williams, T. Karako, “North Korea’s New Missiles on Parade”, Center for Strategic & International 
Studies, 18 April 2017, at <https://www.csis.org/analysis/north-koreas-new-missiles-parade>, 20 April 
2017.
20 D. Wright, “North Korea Appears to Launch Missile with 6,700 km Range”, (Blog) All Things Nucle-
ar, Union of Concerned Scientists, 3 July 2017, at <http://allthingsnuclear.org/dwright/north-korea-
appears-to-launch-missile-with-6700-km-range>, 6 July 2017.
21 A. Levite, S. Brom, “From Dream to Reality”, in C.M. Kelleher, P. Dombrowski (eds.), Regional Missile 
Defense..., p. 138.
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very special tool out of those relatively not so powerful weapons.22 Israel assesses that 
the stockpile of the Hezbollah alone consists of 100 000 missiles.23 Currently anti-Israel 
groups are in the process of acquiring more potent weapons systems with greater range 
and fitted with guidance systems that should be classified as SRBMs. Probably some of 
them have the range of even 700 km.24 
Others. Ballistic missiles of the SRBM class are stockpiled in the arsenals of many 
countries and non-state actors, especially in the Middle East and across the post-Soviet 
space. Most of them, however, are relatively out-of-date Soviet models designed during 
the ’50 of the 20th century. Some of them are domestically modernized end then ex-
ported by such countries like North Korea or Iran, some originate from China. Despite 
this technical backwardness, all those missiles can easily become a political instrument 
of the sort we have described above, if they are successfully equipped with WMD or 
precision-strike munitions. There are also some instances of modern and very capable 
missiles, like Saudi Arabia that owns Chinese made MRBMs DF-21,25 or Armenia, that 
has recently acquired Iskander SRBMs from Russia.26 In both cases the deterrent role of 
those weapons is quite clear. 
Summarizing, according to the official assessments by the US authorities, outside 
the arsenals of the NATO countries, China and Russia there are well over 7000 ballistic 
missiles of the SRBM class or bigger – by the end of the decade this number is supposed 
to reach 8000.27 Apart from this, many countries possess large quantities of artillery-
rocket systems, but they are not relevant from our point of view, because of lack of the 
special political importance – save the arsenals of the anti-Israel militant groups.
22 M. Czajkowski, Obrona…, pp. 149-152.
23 “Israel: Any War with Hezbollah Will Be Devastating”, Al Jazeera, 20 April 2016, at <http://www.
aljazeera.com/news/2016/04/israel-war-hezbollah-devastating-160420183832190.html>, 8 January 
2016.
24 Russian made Scud-D missiles, allegedly transferred to Hezbollah from Syria, see A. Barnard, 
E. Schmitt, “Hezbollah Moving Long-Range Missiles from Syria to Lebanon, an Analyst Says”, New 
York Times, 2 January 2014, at <https://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/03/world/middleeast/hezbollah- 
is-said-to-transfer-missiles.html?_r=0>, 9 May 2017. 
25 J. Lewis, “Why Did Saudi Arabia Buy Chinese Missiles?”, Foreign Policy, 30 January 2014, at <http://
foreignpolicy.com/2014/01/30/why-did-saudi-arabia-buy-chinese-missiles/>, 8 January 2017.
26 Z. Shiriyev, “Azerbaijan’s Possible Reactions to Armenia’s Iskanders: Defense Versus Offense”, Eurasia 
Daily Monitor, vol. 13, no. 160 (5 October 2016), at <https://jamestown.org/program/azerbaijans-
possible-reactions-armenias-iskanders-defense-versus-offense/#sthash.fsQvtrgA.dpuf>, 8 January 2017.
27 According to the Missile Defense Agency, see J.D. Syring, Ballistic Missile Defense Overiew, Missile 
Defense Agency, 14 August 2013, at <https://pl.scribd.com/document/176023320/Ballistic-Missile- 
Defence-Overview>, 8 January 2017.
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2. THE NATURE OF MISSILE DEFENCE
It has already been stated that the properties of ballistic missiles make them extremely 
difficult to counter – and this is obviously one of their most important features. It 
stems out of the following:
 – high velocity of ballistic missiles is very high in comparison to distances they cover;
therefore, when they enter the detection range and subsequently the firing range of
the defence system the time that remains for it to react is relatively short,
 – velocity of ballistic missiles requires use of the interceptors which are also very fast
and which have the ability to conduct very accurate and extremely quick manoeu-
vres,
 – high altitudes of ballistic missiles’ trajectories add up to the fact that they are in
range of classic endo-atmospheric air-defence weapons for very short time – de-
ployment of multiple lines of defences against ballistic missiles calls for the weapons 
systems capable to operate within very high layers of the atmosphere or even out-
side of it,
 – ballistic missiles or their independently travelling warheads are relatively small tar-
gets and it also adds to the difficulty of countering them in all phases, from the de-
tection, through the whole process of the target acquisition and calculation of the
fire solution to the interception sequence.
Because of all the above-mentioned technical parameters a ballistic missile is an of-
fensive weapon that maintains overall superiority over defensive systems. This situation 
persists from the moment ballistic missiles were used for the very first time as the in-
strument meant to deliver the strategic impact on the enemy during the World War II. 
Since some 5500 A-4/V-1 rockets were used by the Germans between September 1944 
and March 1945, ballistic missiles remain the weapon that is extremely difficult to cope 
with. Save one very specific example, there is virtually no defence system capable of de-
feating ballistic missiles effectively enough that it would be comparable to other current 
defensive weapons such as anti-tank or anti-aircraft systems.28 And it is despite the fact 
that since 1945 missile defence was one of the centrepieces of the strategic planning and 
vast amounts of money have been poured into its development over decades, especially 
in USA and USSR.
The 21st century did bring some new technologies that could be used to intercept at 
least certain kinds of ballistic missiles. But on the other hand we are witnessing a con-
stant development of rocketry that nullifies that progress to great extent, rendering mis-
sile defence still unreliable. Over the decades ballistic missiles have become more and 
more resistant to defence, which adds up to their already mentioned properties that 
come out of the general laws of physics. The development of the strategies and the tech-
nologies designed to overcome missile defence started as early as in the sixties of the 
20th century and soon yielded considerable effect. Thus, already over half a century ago 
many types of ballistic missiles were routinely equipped with the devices called penetra-
28 More on the development of missile defence, see M. Czajkowski, Obrona…, pp. 93-145.
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tion aids (penaids), designed to overcome missile defence. Special strategies supposed 
to help the missiles go through were also being perfected through the decades.
Thus, ironically, there is an important asymmetry in the development process and 
current state of ballistic missiles versus missile defence. The former were being perfect-
ed for a long time, with special attention to their capabilities to overcome the defences 
that until today, have not materialized in the military relevant form. The latter was be-
ing developed simultaneously, but only today it has reached the stage of deployed weap-
ons systems supposed to be effective to an extent. So, while still in statu nascendi missile 
defence has to stand up against the huge obstacle of experience with its penetration that 
has been accumulated over the decades.
In short and without details, the technical means designed to overcome missile de-
fence are as follows:29
 – decoys are the objects that defence sees as identical to the actual rocket or warhead;
missile might deploy them in significant number to compel defence to multiply the
number of interceptors fired; there are many kinds of decoys and their effectiveness
differs, but is generally considered high – the simplest of them, as some analyses
hold, are available for the installation even on board of the relatively unsophisti-
cated ballistic missiles,30
 – jamming devices that may be fitted on missiles, their upper stages or on the war-
heads to distort radar or thermal tracking and targeting systems,
 – stealth technologies or the other means of camouflaging missiles or their warheads
may also be employed to protect them from the detection or to make the tracking
and targeting more difficult.
Besides the technical means of overcoming missile defence there are also certain
strategies that may be applied to enhance the effectiveness of ballistic missiles. The 
most important are:
 – a missile, its upper stage or even the single warhead may manoeuvre on its flight
to conduct course corrections; even the slightest change of the missile’s trajectory
compels the defence to recalculate tracking or targeting, thus delaying the moment
when the fire solution is computed and shortening the time left for the intercep-
tion; it may even force the repetition of the whole process, even several times, finally 
wrecking all the defence action and even causing the waste of the interceptor units,
 – if there are more ballistic missiles available for the attack, some of them may be di-
rected to blind the radar and other surveillance, tracking and targeting systems by
the multimegaton nuclear blast in the stratosphere – it is one of the most effective
countermeasures,
 – missile force may use multiple attack patterns designed to impede defence, especial-
ly by the way of cutting the time left for defence actions – there may be other than
29 More on this, see comprehensive technical analysis in: A.M. Sessler at al., Countermeasures. A Technical 
Evaluation of the Operational Effectiveness of the Planned US National Missile Defense System, Union 
of Concerned Scientists, Cambridge, Mass. 2000, at <https://drum.lib.umd.edu/bitstream/handle
/1903/4333/2000-UCS-CM.pdf ?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>, 25 April 2017.
30 Ibid., pp. xx-xxi.
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minimum energy trajectories employed, like lofted or depressed ones; a missile may 
even enter the low orbit instead of travelling along the ballistic curve that would al-
low it to appear over the radar horizon of the defence very late,31
 – the offensive side may also decide to allocate the missiles in several waves where the
first few would be designed specifically to destroy or saturate the defences – addi-
tionally it may concentrate on some selected area in order to make a  local break-
through by saturation and by doing this it could achieve the strategic objective.
It is worth noting that all of those means and strategies are relatively unsophisti-
cated, at least the simplest of them. It is generally understood that the penaids, not to 
mention attack strategies, are generally easier to develop than missile defence. And that 
is precisely why ballistic missiles, those which can apply means and methods to over-
come missile defence, are still way ahead of defensive capabilities. It is even argued, and 
it is an argument which is convincing to some extent that this state of affairs is an im-
manent feature of certain technologies and their combinations and it is rather impos-
sible to change.32
It is necessary to underline at this point that every country that relies on ballistic 
missiles in its defensive or offensive strategies and therefore regard them as the special 
tool of the security policy, would certainly do everything to ensure its rocket force re-
tain its value. Thus it would undoubtedly use every available method to enhance the 
accuracy, penetration capability and the survivalability of the whole arsenal. It would 
do its best to ensure the other actors of the international stage that its missile force is 
fully capable to fulfill its mission regardless of all the defence. So, in the peacetime or 
during the international crisis the owner of a missile arsenal would surely be developing 
the technologies and strategies and would be strengthening the organization, morale 
and the training of the missile force to stay ahead of the potential opponent’s missile 
defence development. One of important ways to achieve this goal is the development of 
the comprehensive strategies to defeat missile defence in the very first hours of the con-
flict by a concentrated effort of different combat platforms such as the cruise missiles 
together with the possible commando raids and cyber and electronic warfare. 
The last issue is certainly worth elaborating. It is commonly believed that in the 
combat situation missile defence would face ballistic missiles together with their pen-
etration techniques and strategies in a sort of the duel. But in the reality of the actual 
conflict missile defence with its own protective force would be faced not only by the 
enemy’s missiles but also by wide-range multi-spectral counterforce attack relentless-
ly exploiting its inherent vulnerabilities. The newest weapon which might be used to 
counter missile defence is currently entering the advanced testing phase in Russia and 
China and it will probably enter service in the near future. It comprises of warheads 
31 Such a strategy is called fractional orbit bombardment and is especially effective at great distances of 
the attack which would otherwise require very high altitude of ballistic flight instead of fractional orbit 
which may be set as low as 150 km over the Earth’s surface or even lower.
32 A.M. Sessler et al., Countermeasures…
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with hypersonic propulsion launched atop ICBMs that can attack at great speed and at 
relatively low altitudes with the capability to execute aggressive maneuvers.33 
In short, there is multi-faceted offence vs. defence arms race and ballistic missiles, 
modern and sophisticated ones operated by modern and well organized militaries, are 
way ahead every missile defence that is deployable now or would be in the foreseeable 
future.
The other problem that affects the effectiveness of missile defence is obviously the 
economic dimension of the development, deployment and maintenance of the suffi-
cient defensive force, because as there are the most advanced technologies involved, the 
costs are very high. Missile defence is substantially more expensive than classic air de-
fence and that limits the number of the sensors and interceptors which can be bought 
in certain economic circumstances. But here come the numbers:
 – as multiple interceptors are routinely launched against one target, the inventory of
missile defence assets must in theory be at least twofold larger than the whole mis-
sile force of the potential enemy,
 – add maneuvers, decoys and other countermeasures that foil the defences and make
it use even more munitions, the defensive arsenal multiplies again,
 – the more advanced the force that the opponent wields, the larger anti-missile stock-
pile is necessary.
But it is not all. In case of the vast territory it should also be considered that the en-
emy may use the saturation tactics, sending its forces against selected targets. It means 
that to make it effective, every single part or the territory must be protected by missile 
defence systems many times bigger in numbers that the missile force of the enemy. How 
high  the other multiplier is depends on the technical data of the defence systems in 
terms of effective firing range versus missile’s velocity. 
All in all, every missile defence must be much larger in numbers than the arsenal it 
is supposed to counter. Finally, it may be too much a burden for certain country, even 
a rich one. That is why it is usually argued that missile defence is crafted against limited 
targets, in fact no one has ever seriously thought about a total missile defence, and the 
reason for that is in fact mostly economic.
Summarizing to that point, main impediments to the development of missile de-
fence as an effective and reliable weapon are by their nature both technological and eco-
nomic. Both dimensions are also very strictly linked together because the state-of-the 
art technology yields costs. This is of course relative to mission certainty an anti-missile 
system is supposed to fulfill in the given realities, determined by the size and the quality 
of the opposing missile force. 
All the above mentioned difficulties were conceptualized as early as the late six-
ties when the construction of the strategic missile defence systems Sentinel34 and sub-
33 See for example G. Noris, “Classified Report on Hypersonics Says U.S. Lacking Urgency”, Aviation 
Week & Space Technology, 14 February 2017, at <http://aviationweek.com/defense/classified-report-
hypersonics-says-us-lacking-urgency>, 14 February 2017.
34 See the seminal article R.L. Garwin, H. Bethe, “Anti-Ballistic-Missile Systems”, Scientific American, 
vol. 218, no. 3 (1968).
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sequently Safeguard was debated in the United States. Scientists and politicians were 
pointing to material limitations that rendered missile defence ineffective in the light 
of the economic impediments and strategic realities.35 The sole strategic system which 
was eventually build for several billion dollars, Safeguard, was designed only to defend 
a small portion of the US nuclear deterrence force as the part of the overall effort to 
retain and enhance its survivalability. The fact that it was also highly vulnerable to 
the enemy’s countermeasures and saturation attack lowered Safeguard’s military sig-
nificance even more. No wonder that the decision to dismantle the system was made 
by the Congress on October 2, 1975, just one day after it was officially introduced into 
the combat readiness.36
The reservations voiced over half the century ago are quite accurate today, though 
many of the corresponding circumstances have changed, especially the general equa-
tion: ballistic missiles versus missile defence. In the sixties, the missile threat first of all 
had the form the strategic nuclear offensive weapons that were in possession of the su-
perpowers alone (with China slowly joining but still way behind). Those powers were 
not only producing vast amounts of delivery systems and nuclear payloads, but were 
also capable to continuously upgrade and deploy new systems with enhanced pene-
tration aids. The subsequent generations of missile defence systems conceived during 
those years were being designed to counter this threat and thus were attributed with 
the term ‘strategic’. Today the missile threat is profoundly more diverse in the quality, 
quantity and the nature of the military and the political missions the missile force of 
a certain nation have to fulfil. 
On the other hand, the research conducted throughout the decades has led to  prac-
tical applications of the new technologies which in turn resulted in the construction of 
the weapons able to intercept at least some kinds of ballistic missiles. More precisely, 
the development of radiolocation technologies, electronics, optronics and computers 
together with the creation of the new construction materials allowed to design and 
field the sensors and weapons systems that can be used to defeat ballistic missiles, with-
in the substantial limitations elaborated below. 
Missile defence systems that are currently in active service are designed along the 
same general principle: radar stations supplemented with infrared and optical sensors 
detect, track and target ballistic missiles that are subsequently destroyed by anti-mis-
sile rockets. The differences among the existing systems lay in the parameters of cer-
tain sensors, interceptors and the command and control units, such as: wavelength on 
which the radar stations operate, power of the emitters, gain of the receivers, range and 
speed, agility and the capability to acquire targets by the interceptors, processing speed 
of computers and capacity of the communication lines. These differences reflect mostly 
the ability of given defence system to destroy certain class or classes of ballistic missiles 
and the ability of  missiles to penetrate given defences. Defensive systems may also be 
35 See for example A. Chayes, J.B. Wiesner (eds.), ABM. An Evaluation of the Decision to Deploy Antibal-
listic Missile System, London 1970, first published in the USA in 1969.
36 D.R. Baucom, Origins of SDI 1944-1983, Lawrence, Kan. 1992, p. 96.
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compiled into a  vertically layered structure, where a  certain area is protected by the 
multiple weapons systems. In such a case different types of weapons are tasked either to 
be deployed against different threats or to be deployed subsequently against one threat 
as it passes through the layers of the defence.
As it was mentioned above, certain weapon systems are designed to engage a certain 
range of targets. As we deem this fact very important, we will now present two exam-
ples of well-known systems and their basic applications in some detail.
First of them is the American air defence system Patriot, the PAC-3 variant which 
is designed to use the interceptor missile MIM-104F (also referred to as PAC-3) dedi-
cated to anti-missile warfare. The system is able to defeat only the SRBMs within thick 
layers of atmosphere with the operational ceiling of 20 km and at the range of 40 km.37 
The other classes of the missiles are too fast for the Patriot – it is not able to calculate 
fire solution within the range of the fire control station and execute the interception 
sequence within the range of its interceptor. Some sources indicate that PAC-3 has 
a limited ability to engage MRBMs and this means that the successful intercept of the 
missile of that class by Patriot is possible only in certain tactical situations, relative to 
the location of the missile’s target with respect to the launcher, its speed and the vector 
of the flight path.
The second example is also American Aegis BMD weapons system with its Standard 
Missile-3 (SM-3). In its current stage of the development it is able to defeat SRBMs and 
MRBMs in every circumstance, with the limited ability to engage IRBMs as well. The 
range of the missile of the fielded versions block IA and block IB is several hundred ki-
lometres and the ceiling about 150 km. 
The weapons systems mentioned in the examples above may also be combined into 
a layered structure where the SM-3s engage the volleys of SRBMs or MRBMs outside 
the atmosphere and then Patriots are used to intercept the remaining SRBMs, and, if 
the tactical situation allows, the MRBMs as well.
The problem with the reaction time is common to all missile defence systems no 
matter what kind of missiles it is supposed to counter. Some answer to it comes from 
network-centric organization of defensive force that would allow targeting the inter-
ceptors via a  remote sensor array or guidance system of the platform other than the 
one that actually launched it. This is the core of the upcoming American systems that 
are currently close to the acquiring this capability. But this concept adds to the techno-
logical complexity of the whole system because it must be deployed across wide areas 
in order to cover the possible flight paths of incoming missiles far enough to make this 
capability be relevant. Such a solution certainly aggravates the economic burden of mis-
sile defence.
We must stress at this point, that even the most modern and highly sophisticated 
missile defence systems still have their significant limitations that reflect the same res-
ervations that Garwin and Bethe pointed to in 1967 in the paper mentioned above. 
37 “Patriot PAC-3”, Military Today, 2017, at <http://www.military-today.com/missiles/patriot_pac3.
htm>, 9 February 2017.
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Penetration aids and attack strategies evolve constantly, as well as the means and tactics 
to engage and destroy missile defence itself, thus the impediments to countering the 
ballistic missile are still in place, or may even be rising. 
But here we come to the differentiation of missile arsenals that is important from 
the point of view of the modern missile defence and its role in the security strategies 
and the foreign policies of given states. Today the missile threat is not only a global one 
that concerns the very existence of the civilization, but also has regional and even lo-
cal dimension, as we have mentioned it describing the roles of ballistic missiles in the 
politics of different countries. Let us remind that today there are both the most modern 
and very primitive ballistic missiles in the stockpiles along with the whole range of the 
types that may be classified in between of those two. Therefore the problem of missile 
defence is very diverse, starting from the global plane, through transregional, regional, 
subregional and local dimensions. In all those perspectives, in different areas there are 
different missiles to be reckoned with, from the huge ICBMs to garage-made artillery 
rockets. That also overlaps with the level of technical sophistication of the missiles that 
means, from the point of view of missile defence, the penetration capabilities. 
Thus, in every given instance the quantitative and qualitative value of the missile 
arsenal must be projected onto the economic capability of the given state to withstand 
the financial burden of the required missile defence. And here we come to the crucial 
conclusion, that the potential and actual effectiveness of missile defence and so its role 
in the state’s policies may vary strongly and depends on a generally simple calculus: ac-
tual threat vs. defence capabilities. What has to be considered firstplace is the actual 
destructive power of a missile arsenal in comparison to the existing critical targets. It 
strictly determines what portion of the every possible attack may be ‘let pass’ by the 
defence. Plainly speaking, it means that it is necessary to calculate what percentage of 
the missiles may go through without crippling the defender beyond the accepted level. 
This calculation becomes very difficult and the error margin comes close to zero in case 
when nuclear weapon is considered. Therefore, if to quote a noted American weapons 
expert: although it is likely that defenses can achieve some degree of effectiveness against 
shorter-range, conventionally armed missiles, for the key mission of defense against long-
range nuclear-armed missiles, the potential effectiveness of missile defenses remains un-
proven.38 
If to make a conclusion concerning the problem of effectiveness, we might observe 
most generally, that modern missile defence (the types that are fielded now or are to be 
introduced soon) may counter qualitatively and quantitatively limited ballistic missile 
threats. It refers to the missiles that do not apply sophisticated penetration techniques 
and strategies and, cumulatively, are not deployed in the number enough to saturate 
the defences, both overall and locally. It is the most general observation that applies to 
every situation in the world where there is the missile threat and the defence to coun-
ter it. More specifically, it should be stressed that the modern ballistic missiles that 
38 G.N. Lewis, “Technical Controversy: Can Missile Defense Work?”, in M. Kelleher, P. Dombrowski 
(eds.), Regional Missile Defense..., p. 63.
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are  capable to deploy a whole range of penaids and are able to attack with the use of 
the sophisticated tactics are extremely difficult to defeat. And it is going to remain so 
in the foreseeable future. Additionally it is expectable that the eventual ballistic mis-
sile offensives would always be accompanied with the attempt to destroy or otherwise 
eliminate missile defence assets by the concentrated effort with the use of diverse means 
and methods of warfare. Especially during broad and complex military campaigns, the 
elimination of the opponent’s missile defence would be surely one of the first opera-
tional goals.
On the other hand, there is research effort underway to enhance missile defence, 
especially in its ability to counter penetration techniques and strategies. It concerns 
both the detection/tracking/discrimination/targeting capabilities and the interception 
techniques of weapons systems. Right now it is relatively difficult to predict what way 
the relation between the missiles penetration capabilities and the defence abilities to 
counter it would evolve in the future, because we do not know what kind of technolog-
ical breakthroughs would occur. But, what is otherwise quite obvious, the qualitative 
change in the available technologies must take place in order to change current advan-
tage of the missiles over the defence. There are, of course, some promising technologies 
under development, such as directed energy weapons or electromagnetic weapons that 
would theoretically allow rapid change in missile defence effectiveness but their real 
combat potential is unknown now. 
3. MISSILE DEFENCE IN THE WORLD
The following presentation of missile defence systems of the world contains the facts 
that are present in the public information space. But we have to remember that many 
of the key parameters of certain types of weapons are considered top secret, so the pic-
ture is not complete. We will briefly describe the main systems of the main countries 
(save the USA that is mentioned in more detail in the next chapter). We will also refer 
in short to the mission that missile defence has to fulfil within the strategies of those 
countries.
Israel. The Jewish State is confronted with the threat of the SRBM/MRBM ar-
senals of its neighbours, especially with the vast force of the Iranian missiles, as well 
as with the huge stockpile of the artillery rocket systems that are in the possession of 
the anti-Israeli militant groups. The latter is of significant strategic importance due 
to the particular geographic determinants of the Tel-Aviv’s security politics.39 Gener-
ally speaking, the Israeli missile defence is the indispensable answer to the build-up of 
enemy’s capabilities that could effectively offset the overall military preponderance of 
39 See M. Czajkowski, “Obrona przeciwrakietowa Izraela”, in R. Kłosowicz, B. Szlachta, J.J. Węc (eds.), 
Dylematy strategiczne XXI wieku. Księga Jubileuszowa dedykowana Profesorowi Michałowi Chorośnic-
kiemu z okazji czterdziestolecia pracy naukowej, Kraków 2013, pp. 221-235.
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Israel in the region. It is then considered a very important instrument of the local stra-
tegic balance. 
The multitude of threats with very specific features compelled Israel to develop 
multi-layered missile defence that starts from the Iron Dome40 system that is designed 
to intercept missiles fired from artillery rocket systems. Its currently fielded variants are 
capable of shooting down the rockets with the range up to 70 km and this task has been 
fulfilled with great success since April 2011. Unique technologies applied in this design 
make itsome 80-90% combat effective. It is being used on regular basis against harass-
ing attacks of anti-Israeli militants and at times against barrages of missiles that occur 
during the more intense hostilities. For example, throughout the operation Protective 
Edge that lasted between July 8th and September 26th, 2014 Hamas fired over 4500 
rockets against Israeli targets. Among them only 700 did actually approach residence 
areas and therefore required interception – according to the official statements 90% 
of them were shot down by the Iron Dome.41 As of August 2016, there were 10 bat-
teries in service – everyone is equipped with 3 or 4 launchers with the complement of 
the 20 Tamir missiles each.42 To date Iron Dome is the only one missile defence system 
in the world with the capability to fulfil designed task comprehensively and proven in 
combat.
The higher layer of the Israeli missile defence comprises of the recently introduced 
multi-role air and missile defence system David’s Sling.43 Its task is to intercept an air-
breathing target of every kind and ballistic missiles of the 40-300 km range.44 In prac-
tice it is supposed to defeat artillery rocket systems of greater range and small SRBMs, 
for example of the Scud family, abundant in the arsenals of Israel’s neighbours, appar-
ently in possession of Hezbollah as well.
The next fielded system is Arrow-245 that is designed to intercept SRBMs and 
MRBMs, especially Iranian Shahab-3 MRBMs,46 at high altitudes up to 50 km. Cur-
rently there are 2-3 batteries of that type in service,47 one of them was used to intercept 
40  (Kipat Barzel) in Hebrew, the English name is the most widely used.
41 A. Ben David, “Iron Dome Blunts 90% of Enemy Rockets”, Aviation Week & Space Technology, 1 Sep-
tember 2014, at <http://aviationweek.com/defense/iron-dome-blunts-90-enemy-rockets>, 6 January 
2017.
42 J. Lokshin, “Iron Dome (Israel)”, Missile Defence Advocacy Alliance, August 2016, at <http://
missiledefenseadvocacy.org/missile-defense-systems-2/allied-air-and-missile-defense-systems/allied-
intercept-systems-coming-soon/iron-dome-israel/>, 6 January 2017.
43  (Keleh David) in Hebrew, but the English name is the most widely used.
44 J. Lokshin, “David’s Sling (Israel)”, Missile Defence Advocacy Alliance, August 2016, at <http://
missiledefenseadvocacy.org/missile-defense-systems-2/allied-air-and-missile-defense-systems/allied-
intercept-systems-coming-soon/davids-sling-israel/>, 6 January 2017.
.Chetz) in Hebrew, but the English name is the most widely used) חץ 45
46 R. Haddick, “This Is Not a Test”, Foreign Policy, 17 August 2012, at <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/
articles/2012/08/17/this_is_not_a_test>, 12 September 2011.
47 Z. Berger, “Arrow (Israel)”, Missile Defence Advocacy Alliance, September 2016, at <http://
missiledefenseadvocacy.org/missile-defense-systems-2/allied-air-and-missile-defense-systems/allied-
intercept-systems-coming-soon/arrow-israel/>, 21 January 2017.
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Syrian air-to-air missile that entered Israeli airspace on March 17, 2017;48 it was the 
baptism of fire of this system. 
The highest layer of Israeli missile defence is Arrow-3, capable to intercept warheads 
of the MRBMs and probably even IRBMs outside the atmosphere. The initial opera-
tional capability of this system has been announced on 18 January 2017.49 
Western Europe. The European members of NATO have two weapons systems that 
may be used against ballistic missiles. First is the Patriot that is represented by two vari-
ants: PAC-2 which is basically air defence weapon but has limited capabilities to en-
gage SRBMs and PAC-3 that has already been mentioned before. The second system 
with roughly similar anti-ballistic capabilities is SAMP/T,50 designed in Franco-Italian 
cooperation. Its land version is called Mamba and it is basically a modern air defence 
system, that thanks to the missile Aster 30 it is able to intercept SRBMs, and it may 
have a  limited capability against MRBMs, although the latter has never been tested. 
It is worth noting that in contrast to the American counterpart, SAMP/T deploys the 
same missile against air-breathing and ballistic targets. France has 10 batteries and It-
aly 551 of Mamba, the system is also offered for export. Its maritime variant is called 
PAAMS52 and in the version that includes Aster 30 missile it is installed on the ships of 
French, Italian and British navies, giving them the same anti-ballistic capabilities.
There is another type of missile defence weapons system, although it has not been 
fully developed yet, named MEADS,53 designed in the German-Italian-American co-
operation. It was supposed to be the continuation and supplement to the Patriot and 
SAMP/T in the air and missile defence of partner countries, combining European ra-
dar technology with the American PAC-3 missile. The program went through vari-
ous difficulties, including the withdrawal of the American side from its financing, but 
 finally the system has been selected by Germany as a replacement of the currently used 
Patriots.54 MEADS is also offered for export.
The NATO countries also developed a  common project termed Active Layered 
Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence (ALTBMD), which was not a  weapon system as 
such but rather a structure within the NATO framework. It was tasked with the devel-
opment of the doctrine, planning and training of those elements of the Allied armed 
48 A. Harel, G. Cohen, J. Khoury, “Israeli Air Force Strikes Targets in Syria; Assad Forces Threaten ‘Direct’ 
Retaliation”, Haaretz, 17 March 2017, at <http://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/1.777902>, 18 March 
2017.
49 Z. Berger, “Arrow (Israel)”.
50 Sol-air moyenne portée terrestre – medium range, surface-to-air, mobile.
51 N. de Larrinaga, “France Receives Last SAMP/T Air Defence System”, IHS Jame’s 360, 17 March 2016, 
at <http://www.janes.com/article/58841/france-receives-last-samp-t-air-defence-system>, 21 January 
2017.
52 Principal Air-to-Air Missile System.
53 Medium-Extedned Range Air Defense System.
54 M. Dura, “Niemcy: Umowa na system MEADS w przyszłym roku?”, Defence24, 14 July 2016, at 
<http://www.defence24.pl/408446,niemcy-umowa-na-system-meads-w-przyszlym-roku>, 7 January 
2017.
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 forces that were involved in missile defence efforts – it was then the integration struc-
ture built over the national units. Initially NATO envisioned only the limited defence 
of its armed forces deployed at the theatre – hence the name of the effort. However 
later on, at the Lisbon summit in 2010, the creation of a defence of the whole Alli-
ance’s territory in Europe was established. Gradually, theatre defence programme was 
merged within awider approach termed NATO Ballistic Missile Defence. The Lisbon 
summit also declared that the NATO Integrated Air Defence System (NATINADS), 
operational since 1961, would be transformed into the effort called NATO Integrated 
Air and Missile Defence (NIAMD), according to the holistic vision of comprehensive 
defence against all kinds of threats. When the NATO Ballistic Missile Defence was 
declared operational in July 2016, the NATO Integrated Air and Missile Defence Sys-
tem (NATINAMDS) became the reality. The system comprises of numerous assets as-
signed by the member states, interconnected to form the unified structure. The Ameri-
can European Phased Adaptive Program (EPAA), together with some other countries’ 
sensors is the key part of the territorial defence, while the other countries’ missile de-
fence units may be used as a theatre defence. 
All this effort is directed chiefly against potential limited threats from the Middle 
East or elsewhere, but not against the Russian vast missile arsenal, although it is often 
portrayed as such. The limited number of missile defence assets and the specifications 
of the Russian modern missiles cannot shift the strategic balance between NATO and 
the Russian Federation. 
Russian Federation. Missile defence is not treated in Russia as an independent 
military instrument. The only dedicated missile defence system is the cold war lega-
cy A-135 Moscow defence perimeter, ineffective and partially deactivated. Apart from 
this within the structures of the Land Forces, The Navy and the Aerospace Force55 
there is a vast number of the S-300P, S-300W and S-300F (the newest variants are  des-
ignated S-400 and S-500) multi-role air and missile defence weapons systems. They all 
have some capabilities against ballistic missiles but it is very difficult to define it pre-
cisely. As the Russians treat their air defence, especially S-400 Triumph, as an impor-
tant tool of political propaganda and information warfare, perceived as such. That is 
why its capabilities are on the one hand largely unconfirmed by independent sources 
and highly ‘mythologized’56 on the other. From time to time the information on the 
other Russian systems, including new strategic ones appears, but their verification is 
also highly problematic. 
Japan. This country is an important partner of the United States in the development 
of sea-based SM-3 system, including the newest SM-3 block IIA. It is already installed 
aboard four guided missile destroyers of the Kongō class and two more of the Atago 
class. Apart from this, the Japanese have sixteen batteries of Patriot PAC-3, which op-
55 In Russian: Воздушно-космические силы Вооружённых сил Российской Федерации, ВКC ВС 
России. The military branch that combines air force plus space force and air defence force under single 
command, established on December 1, 2011.
56 M. Dura, “Rosyjska ‘prawda’ o systemie S-400”, Defence24, 26 January 2017, at <http://www.defence24.
pl/533952,rosyjska-prawda-o-systemie-s-400>, 27 January 2017.
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erate missiles manufactured by Mitsubishi.57 Japan also mulls further enhancement of 
its missile defence by purchasing American-made THAAD or preferably Aegis Ashore 
systems.58 Missile defence sensor network is also well developed and it is highly inte-
grated with American missile defence infrastructure on the Asiatic theatre. From the 
point of view of Japan the most immediate missile threat is of course North Korea with 
its increasingly capable missile arsenal, but the threat from China is also taken into the 
consideration. 
India. Delhi is working on the development of missile defence since the half of 
1980s59 and currently a composite, two-layered system is being fielded. The first layer is 
PAD-1,60 the weapons system that has been developed with the components acquired 
from Israel and from some other countries. It is adjusted to intercept ballistic missiles 
that have the range of 200-2000 km within the 80 km operational ceiling61 and at the 
distances 150-200 km.62 The lower layer of the Indian missile defence is the newly de-
signed, point-defence weapons system AAD63 that is supposed to intercept targets at 
the distance of 30 km and up to the ceiling of 30 km.64 Basically it is an air defence sys-
tem, the anti-ballistic capability is only one of its functions. According to the current 
plans missile defence is to cover Mumbai area in the first place and the region surround-
ing New Delhi later on.65 The establishment of Indian missile defence may undoubt-
edly affect regional stability, taking into account the abovementioned role of missile 
arsenal in the security strategy of Pakistan – it is very likely that it could speed up the 
regional strategic arms race.
China. The Chinese military is highly secretive, that is why not much of detailed 
information is available with regard to missile defence. However, it is well known that 
this country has imported Russian S-300 systems and copied them domestically, prob-
ably with some upgrades. Thus, there are original S-300PMs, S-300PMUs, S-300Fs and 
57 S.M. Pekkanen, “Japan’s Ballistic Missile Defense and ‘Proactive Pacifism’”, in C.M. Kelleher, P. Dom-
browski (eds.), Regional Missile Defense..., pp. 207-218.
58 B. Perrett, “Tokyo Seeks New Ways to Stop North Korean Ballistic Missiles”, Aviation Week & Space 
Technologies, 19 May 2017, at <http://aviationweek.com/aviation-week-space-technology/tokyo-
seeks-new-ways-stop-north-korean-ballistic-missiles>, 19 May 2017.
59 “Powtórna oferta USA dla Indii”, Altair. Agencja Lotnicza, 26 July 2012, at <http://www.altair.com.
pl/news/view?news_id=8233&q=Powt%C3%B3rna%20oferta%20USA%20dla%20Indii>, 27 July 
2012. 
60 Prithvi Air Defence.
61 “DRDO Ballistic Missile Defence System, India”, Army Technology, 2012, at <http://www.army-
technology.com/projects/drdo-bmd/>, 11 March 2013.
62 P. Topychkanov, India’s Prospects in the Area of Ballistic Missile Defense. A Regional Security Perspective, 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Carnegie Moscow Center Working Papers, 3, Moscow 
2012, p. 21.
63 “Kolejne testy Akash”, Altair. Agencja Lotnicza, 14 April 2016, at <http://www.altair.com.pl/news/
view?news_id=19175>, 16 April 2016.
64 P. Topychkanov, India’s…, p. 21.
65 A.C. Winner, “Ballistic Missile Defense in South Asia”, in C.M. Kelleher, P. Dombrowski (eds.), Re-
gional Missile Defense..., p. 186. 
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indigenous HQ-9s in service, however, the combat capabilities of the latter are prob-
ably lesser than of the original.66 China also conducted two test of midcourse missile 
defence,67 but there is no detailed information on that fact. It is widely thought that 
currently China is intensely pondering on the role of its own missile defence in the se-
curity strategy but there is still no precise and comprehensive understanding on this 
matter.68 One of important doctrinal conundrums that China currently has to solve is 
to how to reconcile its long standing and adamant objection with regard to develop-
ment of the American missile defence, considered a threat to the strategic deterrent of 
China and thus highly destabilizing, with its possible own enlarged and evolved, dedi-
cated missile defence.
Others. Basically we may divide other users of missile defence weapons systems 
into the two camps: one that uses the American systems and the second that operates 
Russian ones. Apart from already mentioned countries, the following Middle Eastern 
countries belong to the category: Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and 
United Arab Emirates and in the Far East Korea and Taiwan. All of them operate Pa-
triot PAC-3 air and missile defence systems. Moreover, the UAE have ordered two up-
per tier batteries of the THAAD weapons system to become the first export user of this 
highly sophisticated, dedicated anti-missile system. Qatar is also about to introduce its 
missile defence based on the PAC-3 and THAAD systems.
It is worth noting that Saudi and Emirati missile defence is in constant combat situ-
ation, routinely conducting intercepts of ballistic missiles. In the course of the interna-
tional military intervention in Yemen, that started in April 2015 and is led by Saudi 
Arabia, the rebel Houthi forces regularly fire ballistic missiles against Saudi targets. 
This are mainly Scud family obsolete SRBMs, but there is also the information that 
more sophisticated Russian made Tochka missile was also used. Since the start of the 
operation until May 19th, 2017 as many as 44 ballistic missiles were shot down and 13 
more reached their targets in Saudi Arabia and UAE.69 This data does not however 
give the picture of the combat effectiveness of missile defence assets deployed in Saudi 
Arabia, because, firstly, the defence does not cover whole area of the country and sec-
ondly, these are mostly the official Saudi communiqués, which are routinely denied by 
Houthis. But even if unconfirmed in detail, there is a missile war on the Saudi Arabia’s 
and UAE’s borders.
Russian systems of the S-300P family are in the service in Armenia, Belarus, 
Ukraine, Slovakia, Venezuela, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Iran, Kazakhstan, Syria, Vietnam 
66 T. Szulc, “S-300 i Buk po kantońsku, czyli chińskie wariacje na temat rosyjskich systemów przeciwlot-
niczych”, Nowa Technika Wojskowa, no. 11 (2012), pp. 18-29.
67 T. Farnsworth, “China Conducts Missile Defense Test”, Arms Control Association, March 2013, at 
<http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2013_03/China-Conducts-Missile-Defense-Test>, 30 March 2013.
68 Ch.P. Twomey, M.S. Chase, “Chinese Attitudes Toward Missile Defense”, in C.M. Kelleher, P. Dom-
browski (eds.), Regional Missile Defense..., pp. 207-210.
69 The source of all the data: “The Missile War in Yemen”, Missile Threat – CSIS Missile Defense Project, 
23 October 2016, at <https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile-war-yemen/>, 9 November 2017.
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and Greece (they were bought by Cyprus but transferred to Greece in order not to de-
stabilize the situation on the divided island).
4. MISSILE DEFENCE OF THE USA
The United States consider missile defence to be one of the most important tools of 
their security strategy – there are many reasons for that and it is elaborated in detail in 
one of the following articles.70 That is why the United States fields the most sophisti-
cated, the most advanced and the biggest missile defence system in the world.  Elements 
of the American missile defence are also part of NATO effort and significant portion 
of the military installations of that program are going to be located in Poland, thus in-
fluencing Polish security policy. These are the reasons why it seems proper to devote 
a whole chapter of this paper to describe the Ballistic Missile Defence System (BMDS) 
that has been created by the USA. This would complete the task of our work as an in-
troduction to the four-part set of texts concerning missile defence in the context of the 
security of Poland.
All American effort related to missile defence is coordinated by Missile Defence 
Agency that controls the research and development, testing and acquisition of the as-
sets that are subsequently handed to the combat units. On the other hand, the actual 
use of missile defence is coordinated by the regional Combatant Commands and the 
US Strategic Command, but the certain combat units are within the structure of the 
US Army and US Navy. Missile defence assets are liked into the Command and Con-
trol, Battle Management, and Communications (C2BMC) structure as the integrating 
element of the BMDS. It provides situational awareness by turning detailed data into 
decision quality information for combatant commanders,71 as well as it depicts he status 
of the overall BMDS from the president down to the operational levels of command.72 It 
also provides battle management capability that acts as a force multiplier to achieve inte-
grated, layered ballistic missile defense through improved sensor resource management and 
engagement coordination. It is also responsible for secure network communications for the 
individual sensors and weapon elements of the BMDS.73
In short, BMDS may be defined as global, mostly road-, sea- and air-mobile, modu-
lar missile defence system, based on open, network-centric architecture.74 There are 
four weapons systems that are the effectors of the BMDS, together with the number of 
sensor arrays and supporting elements.
70 See T. Pugacewicz’s article in this issue.
71 “Command and Control, Battle Management, and Communications (C2BMC)”, Missile Defense 
Agency, 2017, at <https://www.mda.mil/system/c2bmc.html>, 23 April 2017.
72 Ibid.
73 Ibid.
74 For more information, see M. Czajkowski, Obrona…, pp. 262-282.
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The top layer of the US missile defence is the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense 
(GMD) that is responsible for the defence of the territory of the United States with the 
use of the Ground Based Interceptors (GBI) based in California and Alaska. The GBIs 
began to be fielded in 2005, to reach planned number of 30 in 2010. According to the 
decision of March 2013, next 14 interceptors are supposed to be added till the end of 
2017. Actually there are 36 of GBIs installed in their silos which remain in operational 
readiness.75 It is worth noting that although combat ready, the system has been field 
tested against the target equivalent to the ICBM’s warhead for the first time in May 30, 
2017.76 It has never been tested in the salvo mode, although the doctrine has probably 
foreseen the deployment of multiple, perhaps even four of them against the single tar-
get77 – such a test is currently scheduled for the summer 2018.78 It means that the whole 
GBI program is largely delayed79 and this makes the effectiveness of missile defence of 
the US soil be at least questionable.
The second missile defence weapons system it is mostly sea-based Aegis Ballistic 
Missile Defense (Aegis BMD) that is installed on the US Navy guided missile cruisers 
and guided missile destroyers. Its core comprises of the family of the Standard Missile 
(SM) interceptors, AN/SPY-1 air defence radar and Aegis battle management system. 
There are many variants of all those elements that define the actual combat capabil-
ity of the given platform, most notable of them are the variety of missiles in use. SM-2 
block IVA and just being introduced as a replacement to SM-6 are dual use anti-aircraft 
and anti-ballistic weapon designed to defeat SRBMs and to a limited scope MRBMs in 
the terminal phase of their flight in the lower layers of the atmosphere. Note that the 
firing ranges of the missiles are commonly quoted in the sources as 200 and 400 km re-
spectively, but that refers to their capabilities against air-breathing targets – the same 
parameter concerning incoming ballistic missiles is substantially smaller and varies in 
accordance to the target missile’s actual velocity. This may change only if the capabil-
ity to engage-on-remote is widely implemented. The upper tier of the Aegis BMD is 
SM-3 that also exists it two variants – block IA and block IB. Both are designed to exo-
atmospheric intercept of the SRBMs and MRBMs, with the limited capacity to engage 
IRBMs. The distance of the intercept is usually quoted as 500 km and the ceiling 160 
km.80 Aegis BMD is currently installed on 33 US warships, 5 of them are Ticonderoga 
75 “Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD)”, Missile Defense Agency, 2017, at <https://www.mda.
mil/system/gmd.html>, 23 April 2017.
76 “Homeland Missile Defense System Successfully Intercepts ICBM Target”, Missile Defense Agency, 
30 May 2017, at <https://www.mda.mil/news/17news0003.html>, 1 June 2017.
77 G.N. Lewis, “Technical Controversy…”, p. 80.
78 Idem, “Delays in Planned GMD Tests”, mostlymissiledefense, 7 June 2017, at <https://mostlymissile 
defense.com/2017/06/07/delays-in-planned-gmd-tests-june-7-2017/>, 10 June 2017.
79 Idem, “Could FTG-15 Delays Prevent the Deployment of 44 GBIs by the End of 2017?”, mostlymis-
siledefense, 2 February 2017, at <https://mostlymissiledefense.com/2017/02/02/could-ftg-15-delays-
prevent-the-deployment-of-44-gbis-by-the-end-of-2017-february-2-2017/>, 6 February 2017.
80 “RIM-161”, Designation-Systems.Net, 2009, at <http://www.designation-systems.net/dusrm/m-161.
html>, 23 April 2017. 
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class cruisers and 28 are Arleigh Burke class destroyers. But a minimum number that 
would ensure that all operational needs are fulfilled is 40 ships, according to reliable 
assessments.81 As of 2014, there were 72 SM-2s missiles in stock, as of May 2015 180 
SM-6s82 were procured and the number of SM-3s, according to budgetary assumption, 
should reach 85 SM-3 block I/IA missiles and 128 SM-3 block IB at the end of 2017 
fiscal year.83
Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) is a road-mobile missile defence 
system designed to intercept SRBMs, MRBMs and IRBMs in highest layers of the at-
mosphere and well beyond, as it is basically an exoatmospheric hit-to-kill weapon. It 
is generally agreed among the experts that this system’s range is about 200 km and the 
operational ceiling is about 150 km.84 There are 6 fire units (batteries) of THAAD85 
currently in service, each of them equipped with 6 launchers that are loaded with total 
48 missiles. 
Over fifty batteries of the Patriot PAC-3 air defence system form the lowest layer 
of the US missile defence. It has already been mentioned above and described in some 
detail, as it is well known and fairly common weapon. 
The BMDS also consists of a wide network of ground based, space-borne and even 
sea-borne sensors that are designed to detect, track, discriminate and target ballistic mis-
siles. The first of the space systems that works for missile defence is the Defence Support 
Program that has been deployed as early as in 1970. Subsequent generations of satel-
lites located in the geosynchronous orbits use infrared sensors designed to detect missile 
launches and provide the information on the location of such events. The second satel-
lite system consisting of two vehicles in the 1350 km orbit, designed especially for the 
BMDS, is the Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS). It not only detects the 
launches missiles, but also tracks their trajectories in the mid-course phase of the flight 
providing preliminary acquisition and the targeting data for the ground sensors, how-
ever the latter feature is still in the development stage. In 2017 an experimental program 
named the Spacebased Kill Assessment (SKA), a network of small sensors hosted on 
commercial satellites, is scheduled to be initiated. It is tasked to support the defence sys-
tem by providing real-time information on the effectiveness of the intercepts. The space-
borne component of the BMDS sensor network is being operated by the US Air Force.
Ground based tracking systems are first of all the huge stationary early warning ra-
dars that were erected during the Cold War and have been updated to serve with the 
81 According to US Navy estimates, in: R. O’Rourke, Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program. 
Background and Issues for Congress, Congressional Research Service, Washington, 25 October 2016, 
p. 14.
82 “Standard Missile-6 (SM-6)”, Missile Threat – CSIS Missile Defense Project, 14 April 2016, at <https://
missilethreat.csis.org/defsys/sm-6/>, 23 April 2017.
83 R. O’Rourke, Navy…, p. 7.
84 “THAAD”, in Encyclopedia Astronautica, 2016, at <http://www.astronautix.com/t/thaad.html>, 
26 April 2017.
85 “Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD)”, Missile Defense Agency, at <https://www.mda.
mil/system/thaad.html>, 21 January 2017.
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BMDS. They are located in California, Great Britain, Greenland, Alaska and on the 
Aleutian Islands and are operated by the US Air Force. Additionally there are five road-
mobile, air-transportable radar stations AN/TPY-1 (the same that serve as fire control 
units for the THAAD system), used as the forward based warning and tracking sys-
tems.86 There is also a unique sea-borne platform, Sea-Based X-Band Radar (SBX) that 
is mounted on the huge (totalling 50 000 tonnes of the displacement when ballasted87) 
floating, self-propelled platform, especially dedicated to co-operate with the GMD. It 
is providing detection, tracking and discrimination data for the defence of the US terri-
tory – as a rule it is supposed to be stationed somewhere in the North Pacific, along the 
axis of the Korean missile threat.
BMDS is, as it was already mentioned, a  global effort, especially because almost 
all of its elements are transportable and may be concentrated in selected areas world-
wide. Currently it is deployed in three operational theatres, against two officially stated 
threats. It means that there are three areas that are supposed to be defended by the assets 
that are deployed there and that remain in active combat duty. Missile defence on the 
given theatre may of course be augmented if needed. 
The first area of deployment of the BMDS is Europe, where USA have conducted 
the EPAA since 2009 and the program in its current shape is about to come to the com-
pletion in the coming year or two. It was supposed to subsequently deploy more and 
more capable systems destined to defend the territories of the European allies of the 
USA against the long range attack from Iran, or more generally, from the Middle East. 
Currently there are four88 guided missile destroyers equipped with the Aegis BMD sys-
tem and SM-2/SM-3/SM-6 interceptors based in Rota, Spain, according to the special 
agreement with this country. The main task of this force is to provide anti-missile pa-
trols across the south European waters with at least two vessels at the time. The second 
element of the EPAA is ground based variant of ship-borne SM-3/Aegis system, called 
Aegis Ashore – there are two bases supposed to be equipped with this system. One lo-
cated in Deveselu, Romania was operationally certified on May 201689 and holds the 
24-cell launcher with SM-3 block IB missiles. The second one is the base in Redziko-
wo, northern Poland. Its construction started in 2016 and should be finished in 2018,
although there are some doubts with regard to that, connected with the possible shift
in American approach to missile defence.90 If completed, this base should be equipped
86 “Army Navy / Transportable Radar Surveillance (AN/TPY-2)”, Missile Defense Agency, 28 July 2016, 
at <https://www.mda.mil/global/documents/pdf/an_tpy2.pdf>, 17 February 2017.
87 “Sea-Based X-Band Radar”, Missile Defense Agency, 28 July 2016, at <https://www.mda.mil/global/
documents/pdf/sbx.pdf>, 25 April 2017.
88 Ross (DDG-71), Donald Cook (DDG-74), Carney (DDG-64) and Porter (DDG-78).
89 “Aegis Ashore Missile Defense System-Romania Operationally Certified”, America’s Navy, Story Num-
ber: NNS160512-11, 12 May 2016, at <http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=94662>, 
26 January 2017.
90 “Redzikowo w grze o nową bazę antyrakietową w USA?”, Altair. Agencja Lotnicza, 9 February 2017, 
at <http://www.altair.com.pl/news/view?news_id=21567>, 9 February 2017.
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with new, much more capable SM-3 block IIA interceptors that have just recently be-
gun the testing procedure.91
The second area of deployment of BMDS assets is the Persian Gulf. It is somehow 
connected with the European theatre but there is very important local context of mis-
sile defence deployment there. American partners such as Gulf States and the most 
notably Israel are constantly threatened by a growing missile threat from Iran. The Jew-
ish state, apart from its own capabilities, hosts one AN/TPY-1 radar station operating 
in the surveillance mode, called Forward Based X-Band Radar (FBX). The second is 
located in Turkey, the third in Qatar. There are also US interceptors deployed in the 
Persian Gulf area: the Gulf and the ocean nearby is patrolled by the two or three Aegis 
BMD vessels and eight Patriot PAC-3 batteries are located in Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar 
and UAE.92 
The third main area of deployment of the US missile defence is the region of the 
north eastern Asia, where a good portion of the BMDS assets is stationed. First of all, 
there is the GMD component in Alaska and California with the SBX radar station in 
forward position. The other assets are 7 Aegis BMD ships stationed in Japan, US Army 
Patriot batteries in South Korea and in some bases throughout the region. Addition-
ally, Guam is protected by the THAAD battery, the other one started to be deployed 
to the location just west of the city Daegu in South Korea on March 7, 201793 – it was 
supposed to reach operational status later that year.94 Officially all those systems are 
supposed to defend Korea, Japan, American forces and the US territory against missile 
launches from North Korea, but it is rather obvious that at least part of this potential 
is directed to counter Chinese threat. It has been already mentioned that China is con-
stantly augmenting A2/AD capabilities and the United States attempt to counter these 
developments in order to ensure operational freedom of action of their armed forces. 
The US consider anti-access strategies as a huge impediment to its overall foreign poli-
cy, as it is to great extend backed by military might which is the symbol and the instru-
ment of the American presence and engagement. In this context missile defence seems 
to be one of the most important necessities.
Further development of the BMDS is supposed to follow two directions. One is the 
91 The first intercept took place on February 3, 2017 – it was the third flight test of the missile, see “U.S., 
Japan Successfully Conduct First SM-3 Block IIA Intercept Test”, Missile Defense Agency, 3 February 
2017, at <https://www.mda.mil/news/17news0002.html>, 6 February 2017. 
92 M. Elleman, W. Alsayed, “Ballistic...”, pp. 175-176.
93 “Pacom Deploys Defensive Anti-Missile System to Korean Peninsula”, US Department of De fense, 
7 March 2017, at <https://www.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/1104428/pacom-deploys-
defensive-anti-missile-system-to-korean-peninsula/>, 26 April 2017.
94 According to the Pentagon Spokesman the battery reached initial operational capability by the end 
of April 2017, but credibility of this information is questionable, minding the overall political situ-
ation within the US and in the current relations between Korea and the United States. See M. Ryan, 
“Controversial Missile Defense Shield Operational in South Korea”, The Washington Post, 1 May 
2017, at <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2017/05/01/controversial-
missile-defense-shield-operational-in-south-korea/?hpid=hp_hp-more-top-stories_cp-thaad-
950pm%3Ahomepage%2Fstory&utm_term=.6038b1b0abea>, 2 May 2017.
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obvious increase of the stockpile of interceptors and the number of launchers, as a anti-
missile arsenal should quantitatively match the threat. The second, much more impor-
tant course of missile defence evolution is the enhancement of combat effectiveness. It 
is no easy task, especially because the quality of the threat also evolves, as it has been 
mentioned before. The BMDS is then constantly enhanced to be able to defend against 
more and more complex targets. There is for example information that the SM-6 test 
conducted in December 2016 involved the intercept of a target missile that simulated 
the flight of the warhead of the Chinese MRBM DF-21D,95 which is designed to attack 
large warships and usually referred to as a carrier-killer. This information is unconfirmed 
however, as the official statement by the MDA is quite general, as usual.96 Of course, 
the testing program is surely more and more advanced and it refers to more and more 
complex situations. Especially the methods of coordination of detection, tracking and 
targeting of various sensor and launch platforms, known as launch-on-remote and en-
gage-on-remote are currently field tested. Thus, the BMDS is in constant development 
and modernization process which is its strength and the weakness at the same time. It is 
for example commonly noticed that  newly fielded variants of weapons are usually not 
fully tested and sometimes must be upgraded immediately after entering service,97 which 
makes the defences somehow unreliable. What is more, some expert observers point out 
that flight tests of the interceptor missiles are carefully scripted and still inadequate in 
many instances. For example, the abovementioned intercept test of the GBI has involved, 
according to the MDA director, the threat-representative ICBM target […].98 However, 
a noted specialist calculated that in fact it represented a missile of the range around 5800 
km.99 True, it is ICBM by the classification, but such a missile would not be able to reach 
the American soil if launched from North Korea. Thus the question of real combat value 
of certain system persists even within the US government agencies,100 along with more 
general critique that refers to the intrinsic difficulties of missile defence, discussed above.
Finally it should be reiterated that missile defence is an increasingly important ele-
95 “‘Fireball’ – We’re Taking It, We’re Taking It, We’re Taking It Down”, Missile Defence Advocacy Al-
liance, 15 December 2016, at <http://missiledefenseadvocacy.org/alert/fireball-were-taking-it-were-
taking-it-were-taking-it-down/>, 10 January 2017.
96 “MDA Conducts SM-6 MRBM Intercept Test”, Missile Defense Agency, 14 December 2016, at 
<https://www.mda.mil/news/16news0012.html>, 10 January 2017.
97 “Opportunity Exists to Strengthen Acquisitions by Reducing Concurrency”, GAO-12-486, US Govern-
ment Accountability Office, April 2012, at <http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/590277.pdf>, 4 January 
2013.
98 The quotation from: J. Judson, “Missile Takedown: Historic ICBM Intercept Test Sends Strong Mes-
sage to North Korea”, Defence News, 30 May 2017, at <http://www.defensenews.com/articles/direct-
collision-for-us-homeland-missile-defense-interceptor-test-against-icbm-target>, 1 June 2017.
99 L. Grego, “What You Should Know about the Upcoming GMD Missile Defense Test: Part 1”, (Blog) 
All Things Nuclear, Union of Concerned Scientists, 29 May 2017, at <http://allthingsnuclear.org/
lgrego/2017-gmd-test-part-1#.WSzW-F13miM.twitter>, 6 June 2017.
100 “Some Progress Delivering Capabilities, but Challenges with Testing Transparency and Requirements 
Development Need to Be Addressed”, US Government Accountability Office, May 2017, at <https://
www.gao.gov/assets/690/684961.pdf>, 5 June 2017.
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ment of the US security strategy and foreign policy and it will remain so. That is why 
it will be developed in the future, probably with even more and more emphasis. Today 
its role is predominantly political, as it is an instrument of deterrence oriented against 
the weaker actors that consider ballistic missiles to be an asymmetric tool counterbal-
ancing American military advantage. The second task of the US missile defence is to 
support the effort to maintain global operational freedom of the US armed forces. This 
refers especially to the Pacific theatre and places BMDS as one of the main military in-
struments used to oppose the enlarging and modernizing military potential of China.
As we are now in the transition period of the new administration reviewing the 
strategies and policies of the United States it is worth noting that the doctrinal and fi-
nancial shape of the future missile defence is not entirely determined. This especially 
refers to the European element of the BMDS in the context of still vague US policy 
towards Russia which has staunchly opposed the American effort to date.101 On the 
other hand it seems that in general terms the presidential apprehension towards missile 
defence is secure, especially when it comes to the defence of the US soil.102 Many of the 
uncertainties will probably be clarified with the Missile Defence Review that is sched-
uled to be published by the end of 2017 and will surely encompass the new vision.103 It 
has been ordered by the Congress even before the presidential election and is enclosed 
in the Defense Authorization Act for FY 2017, passed through Senate on April 18, 
2016. The DAE states that the effort regarding missile defence should encompass the 
measures to defeat missiles prior to launch, defensive means against cruise missiles and 
hypersonic glide weapons.104 So it is calling for focused action on defence against mod-
ern weapons that might contest American military superiority both in the global per-
spective and in the local scale. The same act also calls for the commencement of studies 
that could eventually lead to the construction of space-based anti-missile weapons.105 
The last provision, if implemented, could pose a revolutionary change in the American 
position on missile defence. Additionally, according to the presidential memorandum, 
the new MDR is supposed to: to identify ways of strengthening missile-defense capabili-
ties, rebalancing homeland and theatre defense priorities […].106 The latter provision sug-
101 R. Oswald, “Trump’s Plans for European Missile Defense a Mystery”, The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, 
7 December 2016, at <http://thebulletin.org/trump%E2%80%99s-plans-european-missile-defense-
mystery10258>, 7 January 2017.
102 D. Wasserbly, “Missile Defences a Top Priority for Trump”, IHS Jane’s 360, 23 January, 2017, at <http://
www.janes.com/article/67141/missile-defences-a-top-priority-for-trump>, 6 February 2017.
103 Idem, “Trump, Mattis Begin Shaping Pentagon Programmes”, IHS Jane’s 360, 1 February 2017, at 
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gests possible changes of the current missile defence philosophy which is somehow 
leaning to favor the regional defence in expense of the defence of the US territory.
5. CONCLUSIONS
First of all it should be reiterated that the picture of missile defence in the public dis-
course is usually skewed by mythological attitude and wishful thinking with regard to 
its effectiveness – this observation refers not only to Poland. Of course, missile de-
fence may find its place in the military policy and security strategy of every country, 
but the expectations concerning its effectiveness are usually highly excessive – and that 
certainly complicates every debate on the subject. In other words, it is commonly be-
lieved, that because there are such weapon systems that are called anti-missile it means 
that they are generally effective within their anti-missile task. It is also usually omitted 
that all the systems that are currently fielded, together with the ones under the develop-
ment, are designed to counter only certain threats in certain situations and it is usually 
not possible to move them into another tactical and strategic environment. 
Missile defence is therefore an important element of defence strategies as well as 
of the foreign policies of many countries, especially of Israel and the United States. 
But its role is strictly defined within the framework of certain technological, organiza-
tional and politico-strategic realities. Of course, its significance increases as the missile 
threat increases quantitatively and qualitatively, but nevertheless, missile defence is still 
in relatively early stages of the development and its effectiveness as the weapon is still 
in question. 
Let us illustrate the problem. As of today the only missile defence system that has 
been comprehensively battle proven is Israeli Iron Dome. But note that it was designed 
specifically to defeat artillery rocket systems, as described above. But what would its 
effectiveness be against the same quantity of missiles equipped with the simplest guid-
ance system? Firstly, there would be three to four times more of them to intercept, and 
secondly they would be maneuvering, thus being much more difficult to intercept. It is 
rather obvious that anti-Israeli militants will do whatever it takes to obtain guided mis-
siles to restore the usefulness of their missile force as the strategic weapon of terror. In 
fact there are indications that at least some quantity of guided weapons is already in the 
possession of the militants,107 more would likely follow. No one can predict now if Iron 
Dome will remain effective enough in such conditions or it would be saturated and de-
feated. This way, serious doubts regarding the effectiveness of the system persist, even 
though it is the best proven system. 
Similarly, American systems, despite the constant enhancement of the methods of 
foiling the penetration capabilities of modern ballistic missiles, have still not been bat-
tle-tested against the most modern of that kind. Patriot PAC-3 used several times in 
107 A. Harel, “Israel’s New Missile Defense System Is a Clear Message to Iran, but It Isn’t Perfect”, Haaretz, 
3 April 2017, at <http://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-1.781028>, 26 April 2017.
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Iraq in 2003 and currently fighting the Houthi insurgency missile attacks against Saudi 
Arabia has been confronted only with rather primitive missile designs. 
Save those two very specific instances we can parse the effectiveness of the weap-
ons fielded or being developed only according to their test’s results. But by their nature 
tests are only supposed to confirm simulations in a controlled environment that is pro-
foundly different from real battlefield. In fact, the testing, however realistic it would 
be, can allow assessing only the reliability of certain technologies, but when it comes 
to operational effectiveness, only the actual use of the given weapon in the battlefield, 
with all its complexity and uncertainty, can tell.108
If there are some more reassuring indications concerning the effectiveness of mis-
sile defence, they are few and must not be taken at face value. Thus, if the information, 
that Saudi Patriots brought down soviet-made Tochka missile confirms it would surely 
mean some advance, because it is a more demanding target than the obsolete Scud, or 
something else of the sort. But still, if rebels were able to use missile’s full potential, it is 
uncertain. The same goes for the downing of the target mocking the DF-21D’s warhead 
by the American SM-6 – if this is true it would be an important step forward, but this 
information is not confirmed. Probably the best news for missile defence is that Israel is 
apparently working on the design of the laser-beam variant of the Iron Dome. Should 
it materialize it would offset the coming rise of quality of the anti-Israel militant’s arse-
nal. From the wider perspective, it would also be the beginning of the  expected break-
through in missile defence principles, but it is still unsure right now. 
Finally, it should be underlined that according to American doctrine and declared 
role of the BMDS, it is supposed to fight only the quantitatively and qualitatively lim-
ited missile threat. On the other hand, it is an important part of the strategy to counter 
anti-access technologies, which would in many instances mean much more demand-
ing threat. But again, according the existing information this task has not been accom-
plished yet, and its completion is rather far away. What is more, the main opponents 
with respect to that are Chinese and Russians and they are not watching American 
progress idly but rather improve their missile technologies and tactics to offset pos-
sible US advances. In fact there is an arms race in progress, with all its uncertainties and 
possible surprises and with its inherent logic of expansion. One of the possible devel-
opments of such a race is weaponization of the outer space, as the US mulls the space-
borne leg of missile defence109 and the opponents develop anti-satellite weapons.
108 G.N. Lewis, “Technical Controversy…”, pp. 81-82.
109 See for example J. Drew, “North Korea’s ICBM Test Renews Calls for Space-Based Kill Layer”, Aviation 
Week, 5 July 2017, at <http://aviationweek.com/defense/north-korea-s-icbm-test-renews-calls-space-
based-kill-layer>, 6 July 2017.
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